What is a first order desire Frankfurt?

What is an effective first order desire?

The distinction of interest is that between first order desires which are not effective–i.e., those which do not end up motivating action–and first order desires which are effective–i.e., those which do end up motivating action.

What is first order preference?

A first-order volition is a desire about anything else, such as to own a new car, to meet the pope, or to drink alcohol. Second-order volition are desires about desires, or to desire to change the process, the how, of desiring.

What does Frankfurt mean when he uses the term second order volition?

In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Frankfurt presents such a view of what free action is. … second-order volition: a desire that a certain desire be one’s will, i.e., a desire that a certain desire bring one to action.

What does Frankfurt mean by the will?

will: a first-order desire which is effective, i.e. that causes one to do what one desires to do. A desire to eat a bag of potato chips is one’s will, in Frankfurt’s sense, if that desire brings one to actually eat the bag of potato chips.

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What is a first order desire quizlet?

first order desire. –desire to do or not to do one thing or another. -“A wants to X” second-order volitions. -when he wants certain desire to be his will.

What does order of preference mean?

In economics and other social sciences, preference is the order that a person (an agent) gives to alternatives based on their relative utility, a process which results in an optimal “choice” (whether real or theoretical).

What is first order and second-order desires?

A first order desire is a desire for anything other than a desire; a second order desire is a desire for a desire. So, for instance, you might have a first order desire to smoke a cigarette; and a second order desire that you desire not to smoke a cigarette.

What are second-order preferences?

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. … Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences.

What are Frankfurt cases meant to illustrate?

Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), which holds that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise.

What does Frankfurt say about free will?

Frankfurt states, “A person may do something in circumstances that leave [him] no alterna- tive to doing it, without these circumstances actually moving him or leading him to do it– -without them playing any role, indeed, in bringing it about that he does what he does” (160).

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What is Frankfurt claim about freedom quizlet?

Frankfurt makes a distinction between freedom of action and freedom of will. Freedom of action is the freedom to do what one wants to do. Freedom of will is the freedom to want what one wants to want. Frankfurt also describes freedom of will as the conformity of one’s will to one’s second-order volitions.